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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
J. Rodney Johnson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The General Assembly enacted legislation dealing with wills, 
trusts, and estates that added, amended, or repealed a number 
of sections of the Code of Virginia in the 1996 and 1997 ses-
sions. In addition, there were eleven Supreme Court of Virginia 
opinions in the two-year period ending April 18, 1997, that in-
volved issues of interest to the general practitioner as well as 
the specialist in wills, trusts, and estates. This article reports 
on all of these legislative and judicial developments.1 
II. 1996 LEGISLATION 
A Nonresident Fiduciaries-Prohibitions Eliminated 
Virginia's policy regarding a nonresident individual2 serving 
as a sole fiduciary for an estate, testamentary trust, or an inca-
pacitated person has evolved from a pre-1983 xenophobia to a 
1996 open door policy in a series of legislative enactments3 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., 1965, College 
of William and Mary; J.D., 1967, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William 
and Mary; LL.M., 1970, New York University. . 
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Code of Vrrginia sections, 
they will often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only. 
2. The prohibition against a foreign corporation serving as a fiduciary continues 
in existence. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59(B) (Repl. Vol. 1997). 
3. For the history of this movement as it relates to: (i) personal representatives, 
testamentary trustees, and guardians, committees and trustees of incompetent or 
incapacitated persons, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, 
Trusts and Estates, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 1175, 1182-85 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Annu-
al Survey]; (ii) guardians of the person of infants, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual 
Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 23 U. RICH. L. REv. 859, 860 
(1989); and (iii) trustees of inter vivos trusts receiving pour-overs from wills, see J. 
Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates 25 U. 
1249 
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culminating in the 1996 amendments to sections 26-59 and 
64.1-73.4 The privilege extended to nonresidents is, however, 
subject to certain qualifications as follows: 
(1) Personal Representative, Testamentary Trustee, Guardian 
of an Infant's Estate, Guardian of the Person or Property of an 
Incapacitated Person, and Committee of a Person Non Compos 
Mentis. As amended, subsection A of section 26-59 now provides 
that any nonresident individual may serve as sole fiduciary in 
any of the listed capacities if the fiduciary (i) consents to ser-
vice of process in matters related to the fiduciary office being 
made either on a person designated by the fiduciary or on the 
clerk of court in which the fiduciary qualified, and (ii) posts 
bond with surety, unless surety is waived by the court pursuant 
to section 26-4.5 
(2) Guardian of the Person of an Infant. The 1989 provision 
repealing the residency requirement applicable to a guardian of 
the person of an infant6 is continued in the 1996 legislation 
with a slightly different citation. 7 
(3) Trustee of an Inter Vivos Trust Receiving a Pour-Over 
from a Will. Whereas traditional estate planning has been will-
based, a number of today's estate planners favor a plan based 
upon an inter vivos trust in some instances. In these inter 
vivos trust-based plans, the desire to integrate all of the client's 
RICH. L. REv. 925, 930 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Annual Suruey]. 
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59 (Rep!. Vol. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-73 (Cum. 
Supp. 1997). 
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59(A) (Repl. Vol. 1997). Section 26-4 allows the court and 
its clerk to waive surety in cases involving personal representatives, guardians, and 
committees [but makes no reference to testamentary trustees] when the amount un-
der the control of the fiduciary does not exceed $5000. Id. § 26-4 (Rep!. Vol. 1997). 
Other than this exception, however, section 26-59(A) clearly provides that surety must 
be given, "[n]otwithstanding §§ 37.1-135 [which allows the court to waive surety upon 
the official bonds of committees for incompetent persons, guardians for incapacitated 
persons, and trustees for incompetent ex-service persons] and 64.1-121 [which 
eliminates the need for surety upon the official bonds of personal representatives of a 
decedent's estate in certain cases]." Id. § 26-59(A) (Repl. Vol. 1997). Note that neither 
of the references in the preceding sentence includes a trustee of a testamentary trust. 
This omission, however, should not present a problem because the section authorizing 
clerks to appoint and qualify testamentary trustees calls for them to act "pursuant to 
the provisions of§ 26-59." Id. § 26-46.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997). 
6. See Act of March 23, 1989, ch. 535, 1989 Va. Acts 787 (codified at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 26-59(D) (Repl. Vol. 1992)). 
7. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59(C) (Repl. Vol. 1997). 
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assets into one vehicle following the client's death is accom-
plished by making a testamentary pour-over gift of the net 
residue of the client's probate estate to the inter vivos trust. In 
order to close an obvious loophole, section 64.1-73 has imposed 
residency requirements on the trustee of an inter vivos trust 
receiving such a pour-over that were, from time to time, similar 
to those imposed on a trustee of a testamentary trust by sec-
tion 26-59. Thus, the 1996 amendments to section 64.1-73 fol-
low the pattern of those made to section 26-59, described above, 
with the result that any nonresident individual may serve as 
sole trustee of an inter vivos trust receiving a testamentary 
pour-over if the trustee (i) consents to service of process in 
trust-related matters being made either on a person designated 
by the trustee or on the clerk of court in which the trustee 
qualified, and (ii) posts bond with surety unless surety is 
waived by the court pursuant to section 26-4. s The surety-relat-
ed problems that were noted in these pages following the 1991 
amendments to this section have not yet been addressed and 
thus remain unresolved.9 
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.l-73(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997). Section 26-4 allows the court 
and its clerk to waive surety in cases involving personal representatives, guardians, 
and committees when the amount under the control of the fiduciary does not exceed 
$5000. This section, however, makes no reference to trustees of an inter vivos trust. 
See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-4 (Repl. Vol. 1997). 
9. See Johnson, 1991 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 930 which reads as fol-
lows: 
One question left unanswered by the new amendment is whether 
the amount of the bond and surety must correspond to the value of the 
entire inter vivos trust, or only to the testamentary addition thereto. 
From both a logical and a policy analysis it would appear that the latter 
possibility is the correct answer. A second unanswered question is what 
mechanism, if any, insures the continuing sufficiency of this bond and 
surety? This question is not so easily answered. In the case of a testa-
mentary trustee, section 26-2 of the Code requires the commissioner of 
accounts to examine the sufficiency of the bond and surety of a testa-
mentary trustee as a part of the commissioner's inspection of the testa-
mentary trustee's annual accounting. However, as the trustee of an inter 
vivos trust is not required to make such an accounting, and as section 
64.l-73(dXl) of the Code provides that a testamentary pour over to such 
a trust "shall not be deemed held under a testamentary trust of the 
testator," there appears to be no procedure under existing law to insure 
the continuing sufficiency of the bond and surety. 
Johnson, 1991 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 930. 
1252 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1249 
B. Trust Termination-Settlor's Intent 
Section 55-19.4, entitled, "Petition for reformation of a trust," 
was added to the Code in 1991.10 A concern quickly developed 
that this section's exceptionally liberal trust termination proce-
dure could "be used to destroy much of what estate planning is 
all about ... [and might mean that] the prudent Virginia attor-
ney will be forced to create trusts under the laws of other juris-
dictions in order to insure that a client's legitimate purposes 
will not be frustrated."11 An article published in 1995 spelled 
out the deficiencies of section 55-19.4 in detail and suggested 
mandatory language for their correction.12 These suggested 
changes were enacted, mutatis mutandis, by the 1996 ses-
sion.13 
C. Durable Powers of Attorney-Judicial Discovery 
The 1995 Session enacted far reaching reform measures relat-
ing to non-judicial accountings14 and judicial discovery15 in 
connection with durable powers of attorney.16 The judicial dis-
covery provision was amended in 1996 to require that a request 
for disclosure pursuant to the non-judicial accounting procedure 
must be made before the judicial discovery remedy is available. 
The 1996 amendment also restrictively clarifies the definition of 
the phrase "person interested in the welfare of a principal," by 
changing the operative verb from "includes" [certain persons] to 
10. Act of March 20, 1991, ch. 415, 1991 Va. Acts 621 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 55-19.4 (Repl. Vol. 1995)). 
11. Johnson, 1991 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 932-33. 
12. See J. Rodney Johnson, Trustor's Intent in Termination Cases: An Endangered 
Species in Virginia--i1r Extinct?, VA. ST. B. TR. AND EST. NEWSL. Fall 1995, at 3. 
13. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
14. See Act of March 18, 1995, ch. 369, 1995 Va. Acts 522 (codified at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 11-9.6 (Cum. Supp. 1997)). 
15. See id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-132.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997)). 
16. See generally Johnson, 1995 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 1175-79 (discuss-
ing the relevant 1995 legislation). 
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"is" [those same persons], and slightly enlarges this class by 
including "niece or nephew" therein.17 
D. Joint Bank18 Accounts-Financial Exploitation-Remedy 
The concern for certain victims of financial exploitation ex-
pressed by the 1994 Session, 19 which led to the 1995 enact-
ment of the durable power of attorney reforms mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph of this article,20 resulted in further recom-
mendations being made to the 1996 Session by House Docu-
ment No. 24.21 One of these recommendations focused on the 
ubiquitous joint bank account which, because of its survivorship 
feature, the Supreme Court of Virginia once referred to as "the 
poor man's will."22 Another feature of a joint bank account is 
the. opportunity it presents for a sole depositor to insure con-
tinuing access to the depositor's funds by adding a trusted 
person's name to the account who will be able to access the 
depositor's funds for the depositor's convenience during times of 
illness, etc. Accordingly, House Document No. 24 further recog-
nizes that "[t]o a certain extent, very familiar to those who 
work with persons of modest means, the joint account might 
also be referred to as 'the poor man's durable power of attor-
ney.m23 Not only does this de facto durable power of attorney 
present the same opportunities for financial exploitation as a de 
jure power, House Document No. 24 reports that "more cases of 
financial exploitation of the elderly occur through the abuse of 
a joint account than through a [formal] power of attorney."24 
To provide relief in these joint account cases, the General 
Assembly accepted the specific recommendation of House Docu-
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-132.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
18. Although the text will refer to "bank" accounts for purposes of convenience, 
the legislation and the following discussion is applicable to joint accounts in any 
"financial institution" as that term is defined in VA. CODE .ANN. § 6.1-125.1(3) (Rep!. 
Vol. 1993). 
19. See H.J. Res. 84, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1994). 
20. See generally Johnson, 1995 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 1175-79. 
21. See REPORT OF THE VmGINIA BAR AssOCIATION ON CML REMEDIES TO EN-
HANCE PROTECTION OF VULNERABLE ADULTS FROM FINANCIAL ExPLOITATION, H. Doc. 
No. 24 (1996) [hereinafter H. Doc. No. 24]. 
22. King v. Merryman, 196 Va. 844, 849, 86 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1955). 
23. H. Doc. No. 24, supra note 21, at 4. 
24. Id. 
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ment No. 24 that the non-judicial accounting and the judicial 
discovery remedies enacted in 1995 vis-a-vis the standard dura-
ble power of attorney be extended to joint bank accounts. The 
General Assembly accepted this recommendation by adding new 
section 6.1-125.15:1 to the Virginia Code, which recognizes that: 
(i) "[p]arties to a joint account in a financial institution occupy 
the relation of principal and agent as to each other, with each 
standing as a principal in regard to his ownership interest in 
the joint account25 and as agent in regard to the ownership 
interest of the other party";26 and (ii) "[t]he provisions of §§ 
11-9.6 [non-judicial accounting] and 37.1-132.1 [judicial discov-
ery] shall apply to such principal agent relationships."27 
E. lnfiationary Adjustments 
Over the years, the General Assembly has enacted numerous 
probate related statutes that contain references to specific dol-
lar amounts. It is the destiny of any such statute to decline in 
significance as inflation decreases the actual value of the speci-
fied amount. Responding to this problem, the 1996 Session 
increased the amounts in a number of these statutes as follows: 
(1) Probate Avoidance-Small Estates. The Virginia Code 
contains a number of statutes designed to facilitate the transfer 
of specific kinds of property from the dead to the living without 
requiring the recipients to go through the probate process. 
These statutes are permissive in nature and, although they 
fully protect the transferor who elects to rely upon them, a 
potential transferee cannot force their use. A further common 
denominator in most of these statutes has been a requirement 
25. Notwithstanding the popular misconception that a joint bank account is a 
joint tenancy with the parties thereto owning the deposit equally, the Vrrginia Code 
provides that "[a] joint account belongs, during the lifetimes of all parties, to the 
parties in proportion to the net contributions by each to the sums on deposit, except 
that a joint account between persons married to each other shall belong to them 
equally, and unless, in either case, there is clear and convincing evidence of a dif-
ferent intent." VA. CODE ANN. § 6.l-125.3(A) (Rep!. Vol. 1993). 
26. Id. § 6.1-125.15(1) (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
27. Id. Section 6.1-125.15(1) concludes by providing that "[fJor the purposes of this 
section, the definition of a joint account in a financial institution, and the ownership 
interest of the parties therein, are determined in accordance with the provisions of 
this Chapter [Chapter 2.1 of Title 6.1]." Id. 
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that the value of the property in question not exceed $5,000. 
This ceiling has been increased to $10,000 in the following 
instances: (i) certain sums due decedents from the Common-
wealth, the United States, labor unions or employers;28 (ii) cor-
porate securities owned by the decedent;29 (iii) sums due de-
ceased trust or estate beneficiaries;30 (iv) sums due a "deceased 
inmate of state mental institution";31 (v) sums due a "deceased 
patient of municipally operated health care facility";32 and (vi) 
"personal property belonging to nonresident decedents. "33 
(2) Small Estates Act. The Virginia Small Estate Act has 
provided for an affidavit-based personal property collection 
process in estates where the value of the entire personal pro-
bate estate does not exceed $5000.34 The 1996 legislation in-
creased this ceiling to $10000.35 
(3) Exempt Property and Living Allowance. The 1981 Session 
enacted comprehensive legislation governing the rights of a 
decedent's spouse and children to exempt property and allow-
ances.36 The 1996 amendments increased the exempt property 
allowance from $3500 to $10,000,37 and also increased the 
personal representative's authority to award a living allowance 
from $6000 to $12,000 if payment is made as a lump sum, and 
from $500 to $1000 monthly for one year if payment is made 
on a periodic basis.38 It should be noted that these living al-
lowance amounts are not limitations upon the entitlement 
28. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-123 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
29. See id. § 64.1-123.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
30. See id. § 64.1-123.3 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
31. Id. § 64.1-124 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
32. Id. § 64.1-124.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
33. Id. § 64.1-130 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
34. See §§ 64.1-132.1 to -132.4 (Repl. Vol. 1995). For a discussion of this Act, see 
J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 68 VA. L. REv. 521, 529-30 (1982). 
35. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-132.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
36. See Act of March 22, 1981, ch. 580, 1981 Va. Acts 897 (codified at VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 64.1-151.1 to -151.6 (Repl. Vol. 1995)). For a discussion of this Act and its 
background, see J. Rodney Johnson, Support of the Suruiving Spouse and Minor Chil-
dren in Virginia: Proposed Legislation v. Present La.w, 14 U. RICH. L. REv. 639 
(1980), and Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, supra note 34, at 521-25. 
37. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-151.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
38. See id. § 64.1-151.4 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
1256 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1249 
amount, which remains a "reasonable allowance,"39 but only a 
limitation upon what can be disbursed without court approv-
al.40 
(4) Spendthrift Trusts. The $500,000 ceiling on spendthrift 
trusts that was established in 198041 has been increased to 
$600,000.42 
(5) Abatement-Funeral Expenses. When a decedent's probate 
personal property is not sufficient to pay all claims against the 
decedent's estate, section 64.1-157 establishes an eight-step 
order of priority in which they must be satisfied which, in some 
cases, also includes a limitation on the amount of a claim's 
priority.43 Funeral expenses remain in step three under the 
1996 legislation, but their priority amount increases from $500 
to $2000.44 
F. Will Contest-Nonresident-Limitation Period 
The general limitation period on bringing a plenary proceed-
ing in circuit court to impeach or establish a will that has been 
admitted to, or denied, probate in an ex parte proceeding before 
the court or its clerk is one year from the time the order or 
decree was entered.45 Section 64.1-90, however, provides for 
exten!3ions of this one-year period to certain categories of per-
sons.46 The 1996 amendment to this section eliminates the pro-
vision establishing a two-year period for persons who reside 
outside the Commonwealth at the time the initial order or 
decree is entered in the ex parte proceedings, and thereby puts 
nonresidents on the same footing as residents.47 
39. Id. § 64.1-151.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
40. See id. § 64.1-151.4 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
41. See Act of March 22, 1980, ch. 267, 1980 Va. Acts 288. 
42. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-157 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
44. See id. 
45. See id. § 64.1-89 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
46. See id. § 64.1-90 (Cum. Supp. 1997). Those who were entitled to an enlarged 
period before the 1996 amendment were minors, incapacitated persons, nonresidents 
who have made no personal appearance, and persons who "have been proceeded 
against by order of publication" who have made no personal appearance. Id. § 64.1-90 
(Repl. Vol. 1995). 
47. See id. § 64.1-90 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
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G. Personal Representative's Bond-Reduction 
In the typical ex parte probate proceeding, the clerk of court 
sets the amount of the personal representative's bond based 
upon the personal representative's estimate of the value of the 
decedent's estate under the personal representative's control. 
Although the Virginia Code contains a provision for increasing 
the amount of this bond at a later date if it is found to be 
insufficient,48 there has been no corresponding provision pro-
viding for a reduction thereof if the bond is later found to be 
too large, whether as an original proposition or due to changing 
facts. The 1996 legislation now requires the clerk to redeter-
mine the amount of a personal representative's bond, upon the 
personal representative's request, following a reduction of the 
estate's value that occurs because of disbursements, distribu-
tions, or valuation of assets.49 The authorized bond reductions 
are limited to bonds initially set by the clerk, as opposed to the 
court, and the claimed reduction in value must be supported by 
a commissioner approved inventory or a court confirmed ac-
counting. 50 
H. Personal Representative's Bond-Surety 
Section 64.1-121 eliminates the requirement of a surety upon 
the bonds of executors and administrators if they (or a portion 
of them) take the entirety of a decedent's estate.51 The 1996 
amendment extends the spirit of this rule to include cases 
where the executors (or a portion of them) take the entirety of 
a decedent's residuary estate. Although the executor's bond will 
still be based upon the value of the decedent's estate under the 
executor's control, surety will now have to be given only on that 
portion of the bond that corresponds to the portion of the 
48. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-3 (Repl. Vol. 1992). 
49. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-120 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
50. See id. 
51. See id. § 64.1-121 (Cum. Supp. 1997). This waiver does not extend to cases 
where all of the fiduciaries are nonresidents. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59 (Repl. Vol. 
1997). 
1258 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1249 
decedent's estate that is passing to the non-executor beneficia-
ries.52 
I. Personal Representative-No Incumbent 
The general rule of section 64.1-131 provides that if a two-
month period elapses without a personal representative in of-
fice, the court or clerk "shall, on the motion of any person, 
order any person of the county or city" to serve as personal 
representative.53 The 1996 amendment to this section provides 
that "any sheriff so ordered may decline the appointment if the 
appointment interferes with his current duties or obliga-
tions. "54 
J. Presumption of Death-Disappearance 
Section 64.1-105 of the Virginia Code, dealing with the pre-
sumed death of a person who has not been heard from for a 
period of seven years, requires an unnecessarily long wait in 
some instances where it is reasonable to assume that one has 
in fact died at an earlier time. 55 Thus, this section was amend-
ed in 1996 to cover one such case by providing that a person 
who 
disappears in a foreign country, whose body has not been 
found and who is not known to be alive, upon issuance of a 
report of presumptive death by the Department of State of 
the United States following an investigation by a competent 
local authority, shall be presumed to be dead. 56 
This legislation, which is specifically applicable to State Depart-
ment certificates issued before or after its effective date,57 was 
52. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-121 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
53. Id. § 64.1-131 (Repl. Vol. 1995). Exceptions are made for those cases where 
the vacancy in office is due to a will contest, the infancy of the executor, and the 
absence of the executor. See id. 
54. Id. § 64.1-131 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
55. See id. § 64.1-105 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
56. Id. § 64.1-105 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). Conforming amendments 
are also made to Virginia Code §§ 26-68.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997), 64.1-106 to -110, -112 
(Cum. Supp. 1997). 
57. See Act of April 6, 1996, ch. 675, 1996 Va. Acts 1168 (enacting S.B. 266, Va. 
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enacted on an emergency basis, thus becoming effective on 
April 6, 1996.58 The possible problem with this legislation re-
lates to the emphasized language. Read literally, there are two 
conditions precedent that must be satisfied before the presump-
tion of death arises. They are (i) issuance of a State Depart-
ment report, following (ii) an investigation by a competent local 
authority. Query: how does the Virginia trial court determine 
(a) the identity of "a competent local authority" in Libya, Iraq, 
Haiti, etc., and (b) that this authority has conducted an investi-
gation? It would appear that the statute would be made far 
more effective by the deletion of the second condition precedent. 
And, if this language does not represent an intended condition 
precedent then a fortiori it should be deleted. 
K Clerk's Office-Recordation of Writings 
Section 17-59 of the Virginia Code, which relates to "[e]very 
writing authorized by law to be recorded," provides that the 
clerk may refuse to record any document that fails to contain 
certain information.59 The 1996 amendment adds to these in-
formational requirements the fact that "the first page of the 
document bears an entry showing the name of either the person 
or entity who drafted the instrument."60 Although this section 
is generally regarded as relating primarily to deeds of real 
estate and related papers, its language refers to "[e]very writing 
authorized by law to be recorded"61 and there is anecdotal evi-
dence that some clerks are applying the new requirement to 
powers of attorney. 
Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996)); Act of April 6, 1996, ch. 684, 1996 Va. Acts 1187 
(enacting H.B. 424, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996)). 
58. See Act of April 6, 1996, ch. 675, 1996 Va. Acts 1168 (enacting S.B. 266, Va. 
Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996)); Act of April 16, 1996, ch. 684, 1996 Va. Acts 1187 
(enacting H.B. 424, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996)). 
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-59 (Repl. Vol. 1996). 
60. Id. The amendment contains an exception for writings prepared outside the 
Commonwealth. 
61. Id. 
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L. Judicial Sale of Decedent's Realty-Proceeds 
Section 64.1-184 of the Virginia Code deals with the distribu-
tion of proceeds from the sale of a decedent's real estate by the 
special commissioner appointed to hold them, where the sale 
occurs within one year of the decedent's death.62 Prior to 
amendment, this section has required the commissioner to hold 
the proceeds for the remainder of the year in question before 
making any distribution.63 The 1996 amendment authorizes 
the commissioner to make an earlier distribution "upon the 
posting of a bond with such surety as may be prescribed by the 
court to secure any claims against the property or proceeds. "64 
M. Fiduciaries for Incapacitated Persons-Surety 
Section 37.1-135 of the Virginia Code, dealing with judicial 
appointment of guardians for incapacitated persons, committees 
for incompetent persons, and trustees for incompetent ex-service 
persons, has mandated that the court require surety upon the 
fiduciary's official bond. 65 The 1996 amendment grants the 
court discretion to waive this surety requirement.66 
N. Charitable Gift Annuities 
Section 38.2-106 defines the term "annuities" for all purposes 
of Title 38 of the Virginia Code, the insurance title. 67 The 1996 
amendment to this section excludes from its definition "quali-
fied charitable gift annuities as defined in § 38.2-106.1."68 Two 
new sections provide, among others things, (i) a definition of a 
charitable gift annuity,69 and (ii) that the issuance of qualified 
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-184 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
63. See id. 
64. Id. § 64.1-184 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-135 (Repl. Vol. 1990). 
66. See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-135 (Repl. Vol. 1996). Note that· this waiver provi-
sion will not be applicable if the only (or all of the) fiduciary is a nonresident. See 
discussion supra Part II.A. 
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-106 (Repl. Vol. 1994). 
68. Id. § 38.2-106 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
69. See id. § 38.2-106.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
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charitable annuities is not engaging in the business of insur-
ance. 70 This legislation eliminates a problem for charitable or-
ganizations that had been utilizing charitable gift annuities as 
a part of their fund raising operations.71 
0. Conveyances of Virginia Realty by Foreign Executors 
Section 64.1-149 has validated pre-June 30, 1960 conveyances 
made by an executor under a will containing a power of sale 
that was admitted to probate elsewhere, if the will is also pro-
bated in Virginia, even though the foreign executor did not also 
qualify in Virginia. Section 64.1-150 has validated post-May 31, 
1960 conveyances made under these same circumstances where, 
in addition, a local ancillary administrator also executes the 
deed in question. The 1996 amendments change the dates in 
both of these statutes from 1960 to 1986. 72 
III. 1997 LEGISLATION EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1997 
A. Assisted Conception-Mother's Husband as Donor 
The 1991 Session passed legislation based on the Uniform 
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, which became 
effective July 1, 1993.73 This legislation, which required signifi-
cant estates-related clarification in the 1994 Session,74 was 
further amended in 1997 to clarify that, notwithstanding the 
general rule that a sperm donor is not the parent of a child 
conceived by artificial conception, a donor married to the gesta-
tional mother is the father of the resulting child. 75 
70. See id. § 38.2-3113.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
71. A portion of this enactment that will not be published in the Code reads as 
follows: "That the provisions of this act, amending § 38.2-106, the definition of 'char-
itable gift; annuity' as added by this act in § 38.2-106.1, and subsections A and C in 
§ 38.2-3113.2 as added by this act are declarative of existing law." Act of March 31, 
1996, ch. 425, cl. 2, 1996 Va. Acts 717. 
72. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-149, -150 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
73. Act of March 25, 1991, ch. 600, 1991 Va. Acts 1104-11. 
74. For a discussion of the 1994 legislation, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Sur-
vey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 1145-48 (1994). 
75. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156, -158(AX3) (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
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B. Succession-Illegitimacy-Exhumation 
Section 64.1-5.1 of the Code contains the general rules gov-
erning the existence of a parent-child relationship for succession 
purposes,76 and section 64.1-5.2 of the Code contains certain 
evidentiary provisions that are applicable when the relationship 
sought to be established is based upon a man being the illegiti-
mate father of a child. 77 In addition to all relevant evidence, 
this latter section specifically authorizes the introduction of 
"medically reliable genetic blood grouping tests,"78 and "medi-
cal or anthropological evidence relating to the alleged parentage 
of the child based on tests performed by experts."79 A 1996 
decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia, however, held that 
Virginia's exhumation statute80 "does not authorize an exhu-
mation order for the purpose of establishing paternity. "81 The 
1997 Session amended the exhumation statute to provide that 
the trial court may order disinterment in such cases "for the 
conduct of scientifically reliable genetic tests, including blood 
tests, to prove a biological relationship" if the moving party 
presents substantial evidence that he will prevail under sec-
tions 64.1-5.1 and -5.2.82 The importance of this amendment is 
evidenced by the fact that "[i]n Virginia, approximately one out 
of three children is born out of wedlock. "83 And, even if a dece-
dent leaves no estate or it goes to another, an illegitimate child 
who is entitled to inherit under state law is also a child of the 
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
77. Id. § 64.1-5.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995); see generally J. Rodney Johnson, Inheritance 
Rights of Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 275 (1978); Johnson, 1991 Annual 
Survey, supra note 3, at 925-27 (discussing the background of sections 64.1-5.1 and 
64.1-5.2). 
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.2(7) (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
79. Id. § 64.1-5.2(8) (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
80. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-286 (Repl. Vol. 1992). 
81. Garrett v. Majied, 252 Va. 46, 49, 471 S.E.2d 479, 480 (1996). 
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-286(C) (Repl. Vol. 1997). The amendment further pro-
vides that "[t]he costs of exhumation and testing shall be paid by the moving party 
unless, for good cause shown, the court orders such costs paid from the estate of the 
exhumed deceased." Id. 
83. Gary Robertson, Areas Join to Cut Illegitimacy While Vying for Federal Funds, 
RICH. TIMEs-DISPATCH, July 15, 1997, at Bl. "And in some cities-Richmond (62 per-
cent), Petersburg (69 percent) and Emporia (61 percent}-about two-thirds of the 
births from 1991 to 1995 were illegitimate." Id. 
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decedent for the purpose of Social Security survivor's bene-
fi.ts. 84 
C. Accounts in Financial Institutions-Probate Avoidance-
Ceiling 
Continuing the work initiated by the 1996 Session in making 
inflationary adjustments to the Virginia Code's probate avoid-
ance statutes,85 the 1997 Session increased the ceiling applica-
ble to deposits in banks,86 savings and loan associations,87 
and credit unions from $5000 to $10,000.88 
D. Nonresident Testamentary Trustee-Qualification 
The 1996 Session amended section 26-59 of the Virginia Code 
to allow a nonresident individual to serve as the sole trustee of 
a testamentary trust.89 As no corresponding change was made, 
however, to section 26-46.1 of the Virginia Code, dealing with 
the clerk's appointive powers, such a nonresident could only 
qualify before the court. The 1997 amendment eliminates this 
problem by authorizing the clerk to qualify nonresident individ-
uals as testamentary trustees in accordance with the provisions 
of section 26-59.90 
E. Principal and Income Act-Authorized Deviation 
Virginia's version of the Uniform Principal and Income Act 
provides, among other things, default rules for determining the 
character of receipts and disbursements, i.e., whether they are 
84. See 20 C.F .R §§ 404.350(aX1), 404.354(b) (1997). 
B5. See discussion of the 1996 inflationary amendments to probate avoidance stat-
utes supra Part !I.E. 
B6. See VA. CODE .ANN. § 6.1-71 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
B7. See id. § 6.1-194.5B (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
BB. See id. § 6.1-225.49 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
B9. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
90. See VA. CODE .ANN. § 26-46.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997). The referenced section (sec-
tion 26-59) requires a nonresident individual serving as a sole fiduciary to post surety 
on the fiduciary bond and to have a local agent for service of process. See id. § 26-59 
(RepL VoL 1997). 
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income or principal.91 Document drafters frequently give a fi-
duciary the discretion to make such allocations in a different 
manner for several reasons.92 The 1997 amendment provides 
that making an allocation contrary to the default rules does not 
raise a presumption of imprudence or impartiality if the govern-
ing document specifically grants an allocation power.93 
F. Trusts-Lists of Tangible Personal Property 
The 1995 Session enacted legislation authorizing a testator to 
make gifts of tangible personal property after the will's execu-
tion by way of a writing or list not executed in accordance with 
the formalities required for wills.94 In recognition of the grow-
ing popularity of the revocable inter vivos trust as a will substi-
tute, 95 the 1997 Session extended the tangible personal proper-
ty list concept to trusts.96 Unlike the will provision, however, 
which can dispose of any of the testator's tangible personal 
property, the trust provision can only dispose of tangible per-
sonal property contained in the trust.97 Although applicable 
only to "revocable inter vivos" trusts when introduced, this 
legislation was amended in committee by striking the words 
"revocable inter vivos" from its opening sentence, thereby mak-
ing it applicable to any trust.98 Nevertheless, the prudent at-
torney will typically use this option only in connection with 
revocable inter vivos trusts. The use of this option in connection 
with an irrevocable trust will clearly be a reservation of power 
to alter or amend the trust's disposition of its tangible personal 
91. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-253 to -268 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
92. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 64.l-57(1Xi) (Repl. Vol. 1995) (creating a discretion-
ary allocation power designed to be incorporated by reference into a will or trust). 
93. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-254 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
94. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-45.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996); see also Johnson, 1995 An-
nual Survey, supra note 3, at 1185-86. 
95. See J. Rodney Johnson, The Living Trust vs. The Will: Which is Best for the 
Typical Virginian?, 42 VA. LAW., January 1994 at 37 (suggesting that this popularity 
may not be deserved in the ordinary case). 
96. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
97. See id. 
98. See H.B. 2713, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1997). The words "revocable 
inter vivas," however, were not also deleted from the third sentence of the bill and 
thus they were enacted as a part of section 55-7.2. Such an obvious oversight should 
not create a problem Tor the courts construing this section in light of the legislative 
history. 
1997] WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 1265 
property for federal estate tax purposes,99 and it may be con-
strued to have a broader effect in creditors' rights cases. 
G. Marital Deduction-Terminable Interest Rule 
Federal estate tax law allows a deduction to the estate of a 
married person for estate property that "passes or has passed" 
to a surviving spouse.100 This marital deduction is subject to 
certain limitations, one of which disallows the deduction for a 
spousal gift that is a "terminable interest. "101 Internal Reve-
nue Code § 2056(b)(3) provides an exception to this terminable 
interest rule for gifts that require spousal survival for no more 
than six months and death does not in fact occur. The problem 
foreseen in this connection relates to hypothetical marital gifts 
payable upon "distribution" or "final settlement" of the 
decedent's estate "if' the spouse is then surviving. As the condi-
tion in these cases "is one which may occur either within the 6-
month .period or thereafter, the exception provided by section 
2056(b)(3) will not apply."102 
A similar problem arises when the marital gift is conditioned 
upon the spouse surviving to the time of the gift's distribution 
as opposed to the estate's settlement or distribution. The 1997 
legislation adds a new constructional rule to the Virginia Code 
providing that, in a case requiring survival to gift distribu-
tion, 103 the decedent's language will be construed to require 
"that the spouse survive until the earlier of the date on which 
the distribution occurs or the date six months after the date of 
the death of the testator or decedent."104 Although this provi-
sion is designed to preserve the marital deduction, it could also 
operate to the prejudice of the beneficiaries who would take if 
99. The reservation of this right will cause the property subject to the power to 
be included in the decedent's gross estate under I.R.C. § 2038. Query: If the settlor is 
serving as trustee, and thus could convert trust assets to tangible personal property, 
would not this indirect reservation of power over the entire trust cause complete 
inclusion in the gross estate? 
100. LR.C. § 2056(a) (1997). 
101. Id. § 2056(bX1) (1997). 
102. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-3(b) (1997). 
103. It is unclear why the statute's presumption is limited to "gift distribution" 
and thus is not applicable to "estate settlement" or "estate distribution" cases. 
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.l-66.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
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the condition is not construed out of existence by the statute 
and the spouse actually dies more than six months after the 
decedent but before the date the gift is actually distributed. To 
help reduce such a possibility, the new legislation provides that 
its constructional rule will not apply if the court, in a proceed-
ing brought within twelve months of the decedent's death, finds 
that the decedent intended a contrary result.105 
H. Estate Taxes-Interest and Penalties-Apportionment 
Prior to 1997, the default rule regarding the ultimate burden 
of estate taxes in Virginia provided for apportionment of the 
"taxes" among the beneficiaries in proportion to their interest in 
the decedent's estate.106 The first 1997 amendment makes this 
default rule also applicable to any "interest and penalty" as-
sessed in connection with such taxes.107 The former default 
rule also provided for taxes to be paid out of corpus, without 
apportionment, in cases where a beneficiary received a tempo-
rary interest (in trust for life, term of years, etc.).108 The sec-
ond 1997 amendment allows the fiduciary paying the tax in 
such cases to allocate any interest109 thereon wholly or par-
tially to the temporary interest, corpus or trust account, so long 
as this determination is made "so as to fairly balance all inter-
ests in the property or fund. "110 
I. Commissioners of Accounts-Medicaid-Fees 
Section 26-17.4 of the Virginia Code, which was enacted as 
part of a 1993 revision of the laws relating to the settlement of 
fiduciary accounts, establishes the accounting requirements 
105. See id. § 64.l-66.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997). The proceeding can be filed by the 
decedent's personal representative or by "any affected beneficiary" (who might, in 
some circumstances, not even become aware of the provision's existence during this 
twelve-month period). 
106. See id. § 64.1-161.1 (Rep. Vol. 1995). 
107. Id. § 64.1-161.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
108. See id. § 64.1-161.1 (Rep. Vol. 1995). 
109. Unlike the first amendment, the second amendment does not deal with the 
allocation of any "penaltiesn imposed in connection with the tax, only with the "inter-
est.n 
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-161.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
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applicable to guardians, curators, committees, trustees for ex-
service persons and their beneficiaries, and receivers for minor 
married women. m The 1997 Session amendment to this sec-
tion provides that a commissioner of accounts' fee for settling 
the account of any such fiduciary acting on behalf of a Medicaid 
recipient may not exceed twenty-five dollars.112 
J. Management of Institutional Funds-Definition 
Prior to the 1997 Session, the definition of "institutional 
fund" in the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds 
Act113 excluded "a fund held for an institution by a trustee 
which is not an institution. "114 The 1997 amendment includes 
such a fund if it "is held by the trustee as a component trust of 
a community trust or foundation. "115 
IV. 1997 LEGISLATION EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1998 
Guardianship Reform. A long perceived need for the reform 
of Virginia's adult guardianship laws116 culminated with the 
1997 Session's passage of Senate Bill No. 408, a comprehensive 
reform of both the personal and the property aspects of the 
governing law.117 Because of the number and the far-reaching 
nature of the changes that have been made, this legislation has 
a delayed effective date of January 1, 1998.118 The nature of 
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.4 (Repl. Vol. 1995); see also J. Rodney Johnson, Annu-
al Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 833, 838-
42 (1993) (discussing this revision). 
112. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.4 (Repl. Vol. 1997). The same bill made a con-
forming amendment to section 26-24 dealing generally with fees of commissioners of 
accounts. Id. § 26-24 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
113. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-268.1-.10 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
114. Id. § 55-268.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
115. Id. § 55-268.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
116. See Harriett H. Shivers, Guardianship Laws: Reform Efforts in Virginia, 26 
U. RICH. L. REv. 325, 325-65 (1992) (discussing the need for reform of Virginia's 
adult guardianship laws and the history of reform efforts to 1992). 
117. Act of April 28, 1997, ch. 921, 1997 Va. Acts 2503 technically amended by 
S.B. 1038, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1997) (enacted as Act of April 12, 1997, ch. 
801, 1997 Va. Acts 1973). 
118. Act of April 28, 1997, ch. 921, 1997 Va. Acts 2536; Act of April 2, 1997, ch. 
801, 1997 Va. Acts 2036. 
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this survey and space limitations preclude any meaningful anal-
ysis of this extensive legislation in these materials. 
V. 1997 LEGISLATION EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1998 
In 1993, the Judicial Council of Virginia created a Standing 
Committee on Commissioners of Accounts (the public officials 
charged with the primary responsibility for overseeing fiduciary 
administration in the Commonwealth), and gave it six charges. 
Three of those charges were (i) "to promote uniformity of prac-
tice in the filing and auditing of accounts," (ii) "to provide uni-
form instructions to persons who qualify as fiduciaries," and 
(iii) "to make a continuous review of the statutes relating to 
fiduciaries."119 The Committee's first legislative response to 
these charges resulted in the submission of eleven proposals to 
the 1997 Session which, for purposes of convenience, were in-
cluded in one omnibus bill.120 This legislation, which is noted 
in the following paragraphs,121 has a delayed effective date of 
July 1, 1998122 in order to give the Supreme Court of Virginia 
sufficient time to prepare certain mandated probate forms and 
for all affected parties to become familiar with the new forms 
and other changes. 
A Uniform Probate Forms 
Although the same basic fiduciary administration forms are 
used in all Virginia jurisdictions, many of the forms used for 
the same purpose differ in varying degree from one clerk's office 
119. Letter from the Honorable Harry L. Carrico, Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Virginia to J. Rodney Johnson (Mar. 10, 1993) (on file with the author). The 
other three charges were (i) "to improve the oversight by the courts of Commissioners 
of Accounts," (ii) "to develop training programs and materials," and (iii) "to consider 
the need for uniform fee schedules for Commissioners of Accounts." Id. 
120. H.B. 2085, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1997) (enacted as Act of April 2, 
1997, ch. 842, 1997 Va. Acts 2185). 
121. Two parts of this legislation relate to the commissioner of accounts vis-a-vis 
deeds of trust used as security instruments and thus they are mentioned only in this 
note. The first amends section 26-15 to define "date of sale" for fiduciary accounting 
purposes, and the second amends section 55-59.4 to change the trustee's compensation 
from five percent of gross proceeds to a "reasonable" commission. See VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 26-15 (Repl. Vol. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.4 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
122. Act of April 2, 1997, ch. 842, 1997 Va. Acts 2193. 
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to another. The resulting plethora of same-purpose forms is a 
hindrance to professional fiduciaries and attorneys who practice 
in multiple jurisdictions; it means that some desirable informa-
tion is not always available from the record, and its duplication 
of effort in the preparation and printing of multiple forms is 
wasteful. Thus, the new legislation provides for certain uniform 
forms, and mandates their use. 
(1) Fiduciary Qualification-Memorandum of Facts. The clerk 
of court's need for a convenient way to obtain necessary infor-
mation from a person seeking to qualify as a fiduciary has 
resulted in the creation of various ad hoc forms, all of which 
appear to be derived from a dated, but still authoritative, prac-
tice manual in wide circulation.123 New section 26-1.2 of the 
Code calls for the Supreme Court of Virginia to develop uniform 
fiduciary qualification forms, with instructions, and mandates 
their use in all cases.124 
(2) Inventory. Present law requires every "personal represen-
tative, guardian, curator or committee" to file an inventory 
under oath with the commissioner of accounts disclosing (i) 
personalty under supervision or control, (ii) realty with power of 
sale, and (iii) other known realty.125 Present law also provides 
a permissive form that the fiduciary may use in making this 
inventory.126 The present inventory statute, however, fails to 
recognize that different considerations are sometimes applicable 
to different fiduciaries, and the present permissive forms' stat-
ute, which focuses on personal representatives, doesn't serve the 
complete needs of any fiduciary. As recast by the 1997 Session, 
the inventory statute's oath requirement is eliminated and its 
reporting requirement is divided into two parts, (i) one part 
applying to personal representatives and curators,127 and (ii) 
123. See BROKENBROUGH LAMB, VIRGINIA PROBATE PRACTICE (1957). Form one in 
Judge Lamb's book, entitled "Memorandum of Counsel," is designed to obtain the nec-
essary information for the clerk's qualification of an administrator on an intestate 
estate. See id. at 1. Forms for all other fiduciary offices are found in other parts of 
his book. 
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-1.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). In recogni-
tion of the increasing use of computer technology, the section also provides that "[i]n 
lieu of any form, a computer-generated facsimile of the form may be used by the 
person seeking to qualify." Id. 
125. Id. § 26-12 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
126. Id. § 26-12.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
127. These fiduciaries are required to report (i) personalty under supervision and 
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the other part applying to guardians of an estate, conservators, 
and committees.128 And, paralleling the procedure adopted for 
the qualification forms, the inventory form's statute calls for the 
Supreme Court of Virginia to develop uniform inventory forms, 
with instructions, and mandates their use in all cases.129 Last-
ly, the inventory statute's present rule mandating a further 
inventory of after-discovered property within four months is 
replaced with a more flexible rule that permits the fiduciary to 
(i) file an additional inventory showing only the after-discovered 
assets, (ii) file an amended inventory showing all the assets of 
the estate or, (iii) with the commissioners consent, show the 
after-discovered property on fiduciary's next accounting.130 
(3) Fiduciary Accounting. The Virginia Code presently con-
tains one general-purpose permissive form for "[a]ny accounting 
by a fiduciary,"131 and one optional form for use by testamen-
tary trustees.132 These forms have not proven to be very help-
ful. Attorneys have access to better forms, and consumers, who 
administer most estates without the assistance of an attorney, 
typically are unaware of their existence. Indeed, anecdotal evi-
dence indicates that the consumer-fiduciary's failure to under-
stand how to satisfy the accounting requirement is one of the 
control, (ii) decedent's interest in any multiple party account, (iii) real estate with 
power of sale, and (iv) other realty in decedent's estate, whether in or out of Virgin-
ia. See id. § 26-12(A) (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). 
128. These fiduciaries are required to report: (i) ward's personalty under supervi-
sion and control; (ii) ward's realty; (iii) ward's legal or equitable ownership interest in 
realty or personalty that will pass to another at ward's death, other than by succes-
sion from the ward; and (iv) any periodic payments of money to which the ward is 
entitled. See id. § 26-12(B) (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). Note: When this 
law becomes effective, as a consequence of the reform of guardianship laws mentioned 
in Part IV of this article, the term "guardian of an estate" will apply only to a 
guardian of a minor, the term "conservator" will apply to the fiduciary responsible for 
the property of an adult incapacitated person, and the term "committee" will apply 
only to the fiduciary for an incarcerated person. 
129. See id. § 26-12.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). In recognition of 
the increasing use of computer technology, the section also permits the fiduciary to 
file an inventory "on a computer-generated facsimile of the appropriate form." Id. 
130. See id. § 26-12(D) (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). This section fur-
ther provides that "[t]he filing must be made or the permission granted within four 
months after the discovery of the assets." Id. 
131. Id. § 26-36.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992), repealed by Act of April 2, 1997, ch. 842, 1997 
Va. Acts 2193 (effective July 1, 1998). 
132. See id. § 26-17.8 (Repl. Vol. 1992), repealed by Act of April 2, 1997, ch. 842, 
1997 Va. Acts 2193 (effective July 1, 1998). 
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commissioner of accounts' biggest problems. The 1997 legisla-
tion attempts to ameliorate these problems by mandating that 
(i) the Supreme Court of Virginia develop appropriate fiduciary 
accounting forms, with instructions concerning their use, and 
(ii) clerks of court provide every fiduciary with the appropriate 
form.133 Unlike inventories, however, accountings can and 
sometimes must be made in different formats in order ·to cor-
rectly report the fiduciary's activity and the status of the assets 
under the :fiduciary's control. Therefore, the 1997 amendment 
provides that a fiduciary may make an accounting on the ap-
propriate supreme court form, on a computer-generated facsimi-
le of that form, "or in any other clear format."134 Lastly, the 
1997 amendment clarifies that, in cases of multiple fiduciaries, 
each fiduciary must sign the accounting.135 
B. Fiduciary's Bond-Increase-Clerk's Authority 
The court or its clerk appointing a fiduciary determines the 
amount of that fiduciary's bond based upon an estimate, provid-
ed by the fiduciary, of the value of the property believed to be 
coming under the fiduciary's control. Though made in good 
faith, this estimate may prove to be less than the amount actu-
ally involved. Thus, section 26-2 requires the commissioner of 
accounts to determine the sufficiency of the bond, based upon 
the assets disclosed in the fiduciary's inventory or account, and 
report the findings to the court;136 and section 26-3 authorizes 
the court to increase the fiduciary's bond to a proper 
amount.137 The 1997 legislation requires that the sufficiency 
report under section 26-2 be made to the clerk as well as the 
court, 138 and it amends section 26-3 to confer upon the clerk 
the same authority the court possesses to increase the amount 
133. See id. § 26-17.3 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). 
134. Id. 
135. See id. In this regard, the amendment further provides that "[a] statement in 
a separate document attached to an account that a fiduciary has received, read and 
agrees with the account shall, if signed by the fiduciary, be treated as a signature to 
the account." Id. 
136. Id. § 26-2 (Repl. Vol. 1992). 
137. Id. § 26-3 (Repl. Vol. 1992). 
138. See id. § 26-2 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). 
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of the· fiduciary's bond, except in those cases where the amount 
of the bond was originally established by the court.139 
C. Subpoena Duces Tecum-Commissioner's Power to Issue 
Section 26-8.1 of the Virginia Code confers upon commission-
ers of accounts the power to issue subpoenas to require persons 
to appear before them.140 The 1997 legislation further confers 
upon commissioners the power to issue subpoenas duces tecum 
to require the production of documents before them.141 Follow-
ing the rule presently applicable to appearance subpoenas, the 
commissioner does not have the power to punish for contempt 
when a subpoena duces tecum is not honored, but can only cer-
tify such fact to the court which may punish on the same basis 
as if the court had issued the subpoena.142 
D. Commissioner's Fees 
The Virginia Code presently provides for the fees of commis-
sioners of accounts to be set by reference to the fees allowed to 
commissioners in chancery .143 The 1997 legislation provides for 
the fees of commissioners of accounts to be set by the appoint-
ing court.144 Present law has been obsolete for some time and 
the new language actually reflects the current practice. 
E. Commissioner's Working Papers-Destruction 
All inventories and accounts that are filed with, or made to, 
the commissioner of accounts are, at some point in the settle-
ment process, transmitted by the commissioner to the clerk's 
office where they are duly recorded. In this context, a question 
troubling commissioners around the state is how long should 
they retain their working papers relevant to the transmitted 
139. See id. § 26-3 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). 
140. Id. § 26-8.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992). 
141. See id. § 26-8.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). 
142. See id. 
143. See id. § 26-24 (Repl. Vol. 1992). 
144. See id. § 26-24 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). 
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matter. An informal survey disclosed a variety of practices 
spanning the possible spectrum. 
The 1997 legislation eliminates the uncertainty by authoriz-
ing commissioners to destroy all estate related papers remain-
ing in their possession "when the matter has been closed with a 
confirmed final accounting for more than one year."145 And, in 
order to keep like matters together, the 1997 legislation also 
adds to the section containing the new file destruction rule146 
the present provision relating to the return of vouchers to a 
fiduciary when the commissioner's report on an account is filed 
with the court.147 · 
F. Fiduciary Accounting Requirement-Enforcement 
Present law contains (i) a general provision requiring every 
court appointed fiduciary to account, 148 and (ii) separate provi-
sions dealing with the specific accounting requirements applica-
ble to the various fiduciaries.149 A companion code .provision, 
section 26-18, requires the commissioner of accounts to make 
semi-annual reports to the court identifying those fiduciaries 
who are in default in their accounting responsibility, and states 
the court's required action concerning these defaulting fiducia-
ries.150 The 1997 amendments to section 26-18 give the com-
missioner the option, in lieu of reporting to the court, to "pro-
ceed against each such fiduciary by summons and report to the 
court as provided by § 26-13."151 This desirable change gives 
the commissioner the power to proceed against a defaulting 
fiduciary immediately instead of the fiduciary having a de facto 
immunity until the time of the commissioner's next semi-annual 
report. A further amendment to section 26-18 clarifies that its 
remedies are available when a fiduciary fails "to make a com-
145. Id. § 26-37 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). 
146. See id. 
147. See id. § 26-32 (Repl. Vol. 1992). 
148. See id. § 26-17.3 (Repl. Vol. 1992). 
149. See id. §§ 26-17.3 to -17.7 (Repl. Vol. 1992). 
150. Id. § 26-18 (RepL Vol. 1997). · 
151. Id. § 26-18 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). The referenced Virginia 
Code section 26-13 sets forth the procedure used by the commissioner to enforce the 
filing of inventories. 
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plete and proper account, "152 as opposed to the present "to 
make any such e:xhibit."153 The present "exhibit" language has 
been interpreted by some as making the remedy of section 26-
18 unavailable if a fiduciary has made any form of account, no 
matter how incomplete. The new "complete and proper" lan-
guage is designed to guarantee the availability of a remedy un-
der section 26-18 in such cases. 
G. Fiduciary Investment Requirements 
Present law provides that a fiduciary charged with the in-
vestment of funds who lends them at less than a six percent 
annual rate without prior court approval has the burden of 
establishing (i) an inability to obtain a six percent return on 
good security after the exercise of due diligence, and (ii) the 
reasonableness of the rate actually obtained under the circum-
stances and its fairness to the beneficiary .154 Since time has 
shown that establishing a presumptive percentage return in a 
changing economy is unwise, the 1997 legislation replaces the 
six percent rule with a requirement that the fiduciary "invest in 
accordance with the provisions of§§ 26-40.01, 26-40.1, 26-40.2, 
26-44, 26-44.1, and 26-45.1"155 
VI. 1995-97 JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
A Irrevocable Inter Vivos Trust-Administrative Amendability 
Grantor's irrevocable inter vivos trust in Little v. Ward156 
contained the usual language providing "Grantor does hereby 
expressly relinquish all right, whether acting individually or in 
conjunction with others, to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate 
152. Id. 
153. Id. § 26-18 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (effective until July 1, 1998). 
154. See id. § 26-39 (Repl. Vol. 1992). 
155. Id. § 26-39 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (effective July 1, 1998). The sections cited in the 
quoted language identify Virginia's reconfigured "legal list" and its new "prudent 
investor rule," both of which are discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Suruey of 
Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 26 U. RICH. L. R.EV. 873, 890-91 (1992), and 
other fiduciary investment statutes. 
156. 250 Va. 3, 458 S.E.2d 586 (1995). 
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this Agreement."157 The unusual feature of Grantor's trust was 
the existence of a blank space following the name of the trustee 
throughout the document, originally intended to be used for 
naming a co-trustee and, consistently therewith, a third signa-
ture line and notarial certificate at the document's end.158 
More than ten years following the trust's creation, Grantor, who 
"understood she had 'the ability to fill in that blank, "'159 at-
tempted to make an oral appointment of a co-trustee.160 The 
trial court's decision allowing the modification on the theory 
that it was merely administrative and not substantive was 
reversed by the Supreme Court of Virginia.161 Noting that the 
irrevocability "language is all encompassing, prohibitive of any 
alteration or amendment of the agreement, substantive or 
administrative,"162 the supreme court held that "once the trust 
became operative, the blank spaces became surplusage and, 
thereafter, should have been ignored."163 
B. Fiduciary Accounting-Commissioner's Report-Due Process 
The complainant in Law v. Law,164 a resident of Michigan 
who served as the legal representative of two minors interested 
in a Virginia decedent's estate, maintained that the "limited 
notice afforded by posting (on the courthouse door) as provided 
in Code § 26-27 denied Clayton Law's heirs the opportunity to 
contest the report of the commissioner of accounts in violation 
of the due process clause. "165 The Supreme Court of Virginia, 
however, did not reach this constitutional argument because, 
although the statutory fifteen-day period for filing objections 
had run prior to complainant's filing, the record showed that 
157. Id. at 5, 458 S.E.2d at 587. 
158. See id. 
159. Id. at 6, 458 S.E.2d at 588. 
160. See id. at 6 n.1, 458 S.E.2d at 588 n.1. 
161. See id. at 9, 458 S.E.2d at 589. 
162. Id. at 9, 458 S.E.2d at 590 (emphasis added). 
163. Id. at 9-10, 458 S.E.2d at 590. 
164. No. 941673, (Va. June 23, 1995). The constitutional issue raised by the com-
plainant in this case is advocated in J. Rodney Johnson, The Absence of Due Process 
in Fiduciary Accounting: A Constitutional Concern, VA. BAR Ass'N J. Fall, 1997 at 11-
15. 
165. Law, No. 941673, at 2. 
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the trial court did in fact hear and reject complainant's sub-
stantive arguments.166 
C. Release of Expectancy in Decedent's Estate 
The issue before the Supreme .Court of Virginia in Ware v. 
Crowell161 was "whether a written release of an expectancy 
interest in an ancestor's estate bars the releasing party from 
taking property under the terms of the ancestor's will."168 The 
supreme court answered this issue of "first impression"169 in 
the affirmative, thereby aligning Virginia with "[a]t least twen-
ty-two of the twenty-five jurisdictions that have addressed the 
issue."170 
D. Joint Accounts-Closure-Survivorship Presumption 
The issue before the Supreme Court of Virginia in Craver-
Farrell v. Anderson171 was whether the statutory presumption 
of survivorship between parties to a joint account in a financial 
institution172 continues to apply to the funds from a joint ac-
count following their deposit in a new account when the name 
of the party depositing all of the "joint" funds is not shown on 
the new account at that party's request. Notwithstanding the 
survivor's belief that the funds in the new account continued to 
be the depositor's funds for the depositor's lifetime, and the 
survivor's testimony that title was intended to pass at 
166. See id. 
167. 251 Va. 116, 465 S.E.2d 809 (1996). 
168. Id. at 118, 465 S.E.2d at 810. 
169. The Court distinguished this case from Headrick v. McDowell, 102 Va. 124, 45 
S.E. 804 (1903). "There, we held that covenants with an ancestor to relinquish an 
interest in the ancestor's estate cannot affect application of the statutes governing 
descent and distribution .... However, since Burle died testate, Headrick is inappli-
cable to the present case." Ware, 251 Va. at 120, 465 S.E.2d at 812. Query: If the 
substance of these two cases is the same, is it good policy for their outcome to differ 
based upon the fortuity of the ancestor dying testate or intestate? 
170. Ware, 251 Va. at 119, 465 S.E.2d at 811. 
171. 251 Va. 369, 467 S.E.2d 770 (1996). 
172. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.5(A) (Rep!. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1997). Sur-
prisingly, it appears that neither party made any reference to Code § 6.1-125.15, 
titled "Identification of joint accounts," which requires that financial institutions offer-
ing joint accounts obtain a signed declaration on the account card stating the parties' 
actual intent regarding survivorship. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.15 (Rep!. Vol. 1993). 
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depositor's death, the supreme court held that the trial court 
erred in applying the joint account presumption of survivorship 
to the funds after the joint account was closed.173 
E. Intestate Succession-Illegitimacy-Exhumation 
In Garrett v. Majied, 174 involving the claimed existence of a 
illegitimate parent-child relationship for purposes of intestate 
succession, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Virginia's 
exhumation statute "does not authorize an exhumation order for 
the purpose of establishing paternity."175 In response to this 
case, the 1997 General Assembly amended the exhumation 
statute to provide that the trial court may order disinterment 
in such cases "for the conduct of scientifically reliable genetic 
tests, including blood tests, to prove a biological relationship" if 
the moving party presents substantial evidence that he will 
prevail under§§ 64.1-5.1 and -5.2 of the Virginia Code.176 
F. Inter Vivos Trust-Power of Appointment-Interpretation 
Reversing the trial court's conclusion to the contrary, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia, in Frazer v. Millington177 conclud-
ed that certain language in Grantor's trust relating to the exer-
cise of a special power of appointment was not ambiguous.176 
G. Inter Vivos Trust-Beneficiary's Right to Copy of Entire 
Document 
Following the death of the grantor in Fletcher v. Fletcher,179 
173. See Craver-Farrell, 251 Va. at 373, 467 S.E.2d at 772, (citing Bennet v. First 
& Merchants Nat'l Bank, 233 Va. 355, 360, 355 S.E.2d 888, 890-91 (1987)). 
174. 252 Va. 46, 471 S.E.2d 479 (1996). 
175. Id. at 49, 471 S.E.2d at 480. 
176. VA. CODE .ANN. § 32.1-286(C) (Repl. Vol. 1997). This legislation is discussed in 
Part ill.B. of this article. . 
177. 252 Va. 195, 475 S.E.2d 811 (1996). 
178. See id. at 199, 475 S.E.2d at 814. Although agreeing with the supreme court 
regarding both the grantor's intent and the outcome in this case, one wonders if the 
fact that two courts came to opposite conclusions concerning the proper interpretation 
of the grantor's language doesn't suggest that an ambiguity really did exist. 
179. 253 Va. 30, 480 S.E.2d 488 (1997). 
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her inter vivos trust remained in effect but was divided into 
various subtrusts, one of which was for the benefit of her son, 
James, and his two children. Upon James' request for a copy of 
the entire trust agreement, the trustees gave him only what 
they claimed were the pages relevant to his interest.180 Upon 
James's suit to obtain all of the pages, the trustees advanced 
various reasons why he was not so entitled, and they furnished 
the trial court a complete copy of the trust agreement so it 
could see that they had in fact shared all relevant pages with 
James.181 Affirming the trial court's decision that James was 
entitled to a complete copy, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
found that the trustees "place too much emphasis upon the 
duties of trustees while neglecting the rights of beneficia-
ries. "182 Relying upon the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and 
the works of Professors Scott183 and Bogert184 "in this case of 
first impression in Virginia,"185 the supreme court also provid-
ed an excellent discussion of a trust beneficiary's right to infor-
mation from the trustee.186 
H. Inter Vivos Trust-Time for Distribution 
Grantor's inter vivos trust in Cooper v. Brodie187 called for 
post-death distribution among her beneficiaries following "the 
payment or provision for the payment of ... [death] taxes."188 
Grantor's estate made an election under I.R.C. § 6166A to pay 
estate taxes on an installment basis which, a beneficiary 
claimed, was a "provision for the payment" within the language 
of Grantor's trust, thereby making the trust distributable.189 
180. See id. at 33, 480 S.E.2d at 490. 
181. See id. 
182. Id. at 35, 480 S.E.2d at 491. 
183. AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCO'IT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (4th ed. HIB7). 
184. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (Rev. 2d ed. 
1983). 
185. Fl.etcher, 253 Va. at 35, 480 S.E.2d at 491. 
186. In this connection, the court further noted that, as the record contained no 
finding concerning the existence of an alleged request from Grantor to Trustees to not 
disclose, "we express no opinion on what effect any directive of secrecy by the Grant-
or would have on the outcome of this case." Id. at 36, 480 S.E.2d at 492. 
187. 253 Va. 38, 480 S.E.2d 101 (1997). 
188. Id. at 41, 480 S.E.2d at 102-03. 
189. Id. at 42, 480 S.E.2d at 103. 
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The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court's accep-
tance of this argument because, notwithstanding the election, 
the amount of the estate liability had not yet been determined 
and "[t]hus, there was no way for [the trustee] to provide for 
the payment of the tax. "190 In addition, the supreme court (i) 
upheld the trial court's disallowance of the trustee's claim for 
an additional $500,000 as compensation, where the trustee had 
earlier represented that total compensation as executor and 
trustee would be $120,000 and had claimed that amount as a 
deduction on the estate tax return,191 and (ii) reversed the tri-
al court's refusal to allow the recovery all of the trustee's legal 
fees from trust assets when the trustee had a good faith basis 
for defending the suit.192 
I. Will Execution-Substantial Compliance 
In Draper v. Pauley, 193 a notary public who was called to 
Draper's hospital room wrote at the top of two otherwise blank 
sheets of paper the following: "This is to verify that the signa-
ture below is the true signature of Irene Draper."194 Draper's 
signature and the notary's attestation appeared after this 
statement, and then followed Draper's purported will in the 
handwriting of Pauley, a beneficiary, to whom Draper dictated 
it.195 "When Pauley finished writing, she read the document 
back to Draper, who stated that the document was exactly as 
she wanted it. Then Darlene Butler signed the document beside 
[the notary's] name."196 The Supreme Court of Virginia af-
firmed the trial court's admission of Draper's will to probate 
because (i) Draper acknowledged the writing as her will in the 
presence to two witnesses (Butler and Pauley), and (ii) the 
required two witnesses (Butler and Pauley) subscribed in 
Draper's presence because, under the principles of Robinson v. 
Ward,197 Pauley's writing of her own name as a beneficiary in 
190. Id. at 43, 480 S.E.2d at 103. 
191. See id. at 43, 480 S.E.2d at 104. 
192. See id. at 44, 480 S.E.2d at 104. 
193. 253 Va. 78, 480 S.E.2d 495 (1997). 
194. Id. at 79, 480 S.E.2d at 496. 
195. See id. at 80, 480 S.E.2d at 496. 
196. Id. 
197. 239 Va. 36, 387 S.E.2d 7358 (1990); see also J. Rodney Johnson, Dispensing 
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the text of Draper's will also served as Pauley's witnessing 
signature to the will itself.198 
J. Disclaimer-Life Insurance Proceeds-Creditors' Rights 
Lanasa u. Willey199 was an action against an attorney's wid-
ow on a promissory note executed by the attorney and his wife 
in connection with the attorney's misappropriation of client 
funds. In that case, where the attorney committed suicide sev-
eral week's after the note's execution, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia held that the co-signing widow was liable for the full 
amount of the note, $274,495.22, plus interest.200 The later, 
connected case of Abbott u. Willey, 201 involves the successful 
plaintiffs in the.first case who claim that the widow's purported 
disclaimer of insurance proceeds of $350,845.92, plus interest, 
due her on account of her husband's death, was a fraudulent 
conveyance. The supreme court, however, concluded that the 
widow had an absolute statutory right to make such a disclaim-
er of the proceeds, and that "Code § 64.1-193 makes it perfectly 
clear that the disclaimer relates back 'for all purposes' to the 
effective date of the life insurance policy."202 Thus, because of 
the widow's disclaimer, the proceeds were payable to the 
attorney's secondary beneficiaries (the children) as if the widow 
had died before the insurance policy's effective date.203 
A pregnant sentence in the Court's opinion reads as follows: 
"Kathleen Willey's children received the death benefits and 
used those funds to support their mother."204 The use of these 
funds for the disclaimant's support invites a claim of a possible 
agreement to this effect prior to Kathleen's disclaimer. If such 
an antecedent agreement did exist, then Kathleen was statuto-
with Wills' Act Formalities for Substantively Valid Wills, 18 VA. BAR Ass'N J. Winter, 
1992, at 10. 
198. See Draper, 253 Va. at 81, 480 S.E.2d at 496-97. 
199. 251 Va. 231, 467 S.E.2d 786 (1996). 
200. See id. at 234, 467 S.E.2d at 787. 
201. 253 Va. 88, 479 S.E.2d 528 (1997). 
202. Id. at 91, 479 S.E.2d at 530. 
203. See id. at 92, 479 S.E.2d at 530. 
204. Id. at 90, 479 S.E.2d at 529. 
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rily barred from making a disclaimer. 205 This issue is not dis-
cussed in the supreme court's opinion. 
K Inter Vivos Gift-Capacity-Evidence 
The day before his remarriage, seventy-seven year old Father 
executed a deed of gift conveying certain real estate to Daugh-
ter and himself as joint tenants with survivorship. 206 Ten 
years later, Father sought to set this deed aside on the ground 
that, on the date of the deed's purported execution, "he was 'in-
firm and of enfeebled mind [and] ignorant of the meaning of 
the Deed.'"2°7 Following a lengthy review of the facts, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court's decision in 
Father's favor, emphasizing that in capacity cases "'the testimo-
ny of witnesses who were present when the instrument was exe-
cuted is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of those 
witnesses not present.'"208 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The increased volume of estate-related legislation noted in 
the 1995 review has continued unabated through the past two 
sessions. The Virginia Bar Association, always a significant 
source for the suggestion of estate-related legislation, was 
joined in this regard by the Standing Committee on Commis-
205. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-194 (Repl. Vol. 1995); see also Niklason v. Ramsey, 
233 Va. 161, 353 S.E.2d 783 (1987). 
206. See Hill v. Brooks, 253 Va. 168, 170, 482 S.E.2d 816, 817 (1997). 
207. Id. at 170, 482 S.E.2d at 817-18. In addition, Father alleged that '"if he did 
in fact sign the ... instrument,' [Daughter] 'fraudulently procured his signature."' Id. 
at 170, 482 S.E.2d at 818. 
208. Id. at 175, 482 S.E.2d at 821 (quoting Brown v. Resort Deva., 238 Va. 527, 
529, 385 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1989) (emphasis added). 
Father also argued that his unilateral mistake regarding his "understanding of 
the deed of gifl;'s [e]ffect ... makes the deed voidable." Id. at 178, 482 S.E.2d at 
823. The supreme court dismissed this argument, relying on precedent that "a unilat-
eral mistake may provide a ground of relief only when 'there is a mistake on the 
part of • . . one party, . . . but it is accompanied by 'misrepresentation and fraud by 
the other."' Id., (quoting Ward v. Ward, 239 Va. 1, 5, 387 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1990)). Al-
though the requested cancellation of the deed was unavailable in this case, the Re-
statement does recognize the possibility of reformation of a deed solely on the basis 
of unilateral mistake. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 34.7 cmt. d (1992). 
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sioners of Accounts in 1997,209 and it appears that this latter 
group may be expected to continue in these efforts. As these 
two groups develop a working relationship with each other, the 
Commonwealth can expect to see a continued increase in the 
quality of their submissions to the General Assembly. 
209. See supra Part V (discussing the legislation suggested by the Standing Com-
mittee on Commissioners of Accounts). 
